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A transferable quota system is analysed in a two-period model with market power. So far, the 
management mechanisms presented in the literature to remedy market power have either not 
succeeded in securing efficiency in the distribution of quota within and across time periods, or 
have resulted in only one of the two inefficiencies being eliminated. In this paper a new 
mechanism is introduced where allocation of quota is made dependent upon historic quota 
acquisitions. This opens for a trade-off between distributional and time efficiency, or under 
specific circumstances securing overall efficiency. 
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Tradeable quota regimes have received substantial attention as a possible solution to 
externalities due to pollution (Dales, 1968, Tietenberg, 1980, 1992). Transferable quotas have 
also been seen to be a potential remedy within renewable resource management, and are 
actively applied in a number of countries (Arnason, 1993, Hannesson, 1991, Hersoug, 2002).  
The economic rationale for transferable quotas is that the agents, in for instance a fishery, will 
be motivated to produce as efficiently as possible, due to the incentives underlying, and trades 
will take place ensuring that the most efficient operators utilise the quotas. Initial allocations  
of quota have traditionally been based on historic catch in the case of fisheries, and historic 
levels of emissions in the case of pollution. Hence, history dependence is a fundament upon 
which much management is built. That is, when implementing some form of property rights 
management to eliminate an externality, rights allocations are made based on some 
measurement of historic activity. This has also been the case in the implementation of 
individual transferable quotas (ITQs) in fisheries, where the managers, rather than sell the 
quota to the users, have allocated it for free (or almost for free), based on historic catch and 
sometimes capital input. Hence sharing out rights based on historic behaviour is seen as a 
legitimate mode of allocation. Furthermore, a development that has become increasingly 
visible in fisheries managed with ITQs, is the concentration of quota in the hands of a few 
harvesters (Anon, 2002, Anderson, 1991, Eithórsson, 2000, Armstrong and Sumaila, 2001)TP1PT. 
Hence it is of interest to study quota markets where the potential for market power is present 
and historic catch is the basis for allocation.  
 
                                                          
TP
1
PT Only one paper that explicitly tests for monopoly power in ITQ fisheries has been found. Adelaja et.al. (1998)  
test for market power in the output market of the Mid-Atlantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog fishery, and find it 
absent. The authors admit that the issue of large firms being vertically integrated and hence offering lower ex-
vessel prices to own vessels was not taken into account. They also find that increased expansion of control of 
quota shares may compromise the existing competitive climate in the fishery. 
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Market power in quota markets has been extensively studied within the environmental 
economics literature, but the issue of history dependence has not received any attention in this 
contextTP2PT. Hahn (1984) illustrated how market power in a static tradeable quota system gives 
potential for efficiency losses if the allocations are other than what the agents would hold in 
equilibrium. Van Egteren and Weber (1996) and Chavez and Stranlund (2003) show in static 
models how enforcement may mitigate Hahn’s results. Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) describe a 
discrete time model with the possibility of banking quota. Rubin and Kling (1993) and Rubin 
(1996) study banking and borrowing in models of tradeable pollution permits. Hagem and 
Westskog (1998) design what they call a dynamic durable quota system and contrast it to the 
banking and borrowing (B&B) model. They show how the B&B model is conditionally time 
efficient; i.e. it can secure optimal behaviour across but not within time periods. Hence, 
market efficiency involving the elimination of market power is not ensured in the B&B 
model, while time efficiency is. In the durable model perfect market efficiency is not reached 
either, as the monopolist still sells less than the for the market optimal amount, but 
nonetheless more than in the B&B model. This due to the fact that in the durable model the 
buyer’s expectations of a lower price in the second period reduces their demand in the first 
period. The durable model does not, however, secure time efficiency.  
 
This paper illustrates how a model that gives the buyer an allocation in the second period that 
is some function of the quota bought in the first period, will under certain conditions secure 
market and time efficiency. It is of interest to study under what conditions this model 
outperforms the models previously applied, as regards efficiency. It is shown that a history 
dependent quota allocation model has potential to outperform a durable allocation model and 
at least match a leasing quota model, in that it can ensure either market or time efficiency. 
                                                          
TP
2
PT Bergland, Clark and Pedersen (2001, 2002, 2003) study history dependence in the implementation of a quota 
regime without studying the issue of transferability and concentration. 
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Under specific conditions the trade-off between market and time efficiency can also be 
eliminated. 
 
In the next section a resource management model in the vein of Hagem and Westskog’s 
(1998) pollution models, is designed, and the efficiency requirements analysed.  The original 
model is expanded upon, allowing history dependent allocation, the results of which are 
compared to the models found in the literature. The paper concludes with a discussion of 
allocation modes found in actual fisheries management around the world. 
 
The model 
In the following three versions of a model of a quota market with market power is presented, 
namely, a durable, a leasing and a history dependent model. We assume two agents; a 
monopolist and competitive fringe; i= M, F, respectively, who operate in a natural resource 
market. The study is limited to two time periods; j=1,2. 
 
Definitions: 
jQ  is the total quota harvested in time period j, j=1,2, or the total allowable harvest 
determined by some regulator. We will assume that jQ  is determined exogenously, but can 
vary over the time periods. 
zBj  Bdenotes the transferred harvest share between the two agents M and F in time period j.  
Fjq and Mjq  are the quota shares allotted each group (monopolist and fringe) in each time 
period, where Fjq + Mjq =1 TP
3
PT. 
                                                          
TP
3
PT It is assumed that the initial allocation is restricted by for instance equity considerations such that the quota 
shares allocated are not the shares held in equilibrium. Trading is therefore observed, as discussed in Hahn 
(1984). 
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ijq  is the harvested share, that is, the sum of the allotted share ijq , i=F, M, and the transferred 
share zBj Bin time period j. 
pBij B is the unit market price of the harvest of group i in time period j. 
cBiB(qBijB) is the harvest cost of group i in period j, which depends on the share of harvest 
obtained, since the total quota jQ  is given. 
jτ  is the price of a quota share in time period j 
δ  is the discount rate. 
 
The profits of the fringe group and the monopolist in time period j is respectively described 
by: 
jjFjFjFjjFjFjFj zqcqQpq τπ −−= )()(  
and 
jjMjMjMjjMjMjMj zqcqQpq τπ +−= )()(  
 
where we will define  
)()( ijijijjijijij qcqQpqf −=  
 
The following assumptions are made: 
a) No unused quota (see (1) and (2) below) 
b) No strategic action is made by either group to influence the total allowable harvest. 
c) There is perfect foresight about future quota prices. 
 
UWe study three possibilities: 
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I) Durable quotas; i.e. what is allocated and bought in period 1 can also be used in period 
2, hence long term quotas. 
II) Leasing of quotas; i.e. what is bought in period 1 can only be used in this period, 
hence short term quotasTP4PT.  
III) History dependence; i.e. what is allocated in the second time period is a function of the 
quota bought and sold in the first time period. 
 
Let us first study the long-term model. 
 
I) Durable quotas: 
The harvested shares for the competitive fringe and the monopolist in the two time periods 
are: 
(1) 111 zqq FF +=  and 111 zqq MM −=  
(2) 2112 zzqq FF ++=  and  )( 2112 zzqq MM +−=  
 































The object of the agents involved is to: 
Max FΨ = { }22221111 )()( zqfzqf FFFF τδτ −+−  
<qBF1B, qBF2B, zB1B+zB2B> 
 
and 
Max MΨ = { }22221111 )()( zqfzqf MMMM τδτ +++ , 
                                                          
TP
4
PT Leasing quotas are studied instead of a banking and borrowing mechanism, as the latter is often deemed 
problematic in natural resource management. 
TP
5
PT This presentation follows Hagem and Westskog (1998). 
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<qBM1B, qBM2B, zB1B+zB2B> 
 

































δ , i=F, M 
 
That is, the first equation ensures equal marginal productivity of quota share for each group, 
while the second equation demands equal (discounted) marginal productivity of quota share 
over time.  
 
Let us start by studying the fringe;  
Intuitively, since the quotas are durable, we have that the price the fringe is willing to pay in 






































Thereby making (again abusing notation) 
)( 2122 zz +=ττ  
Let us now look at the monopolist in period 2: 
Max { }22122122 )())(( zzzzzqf MM ⋅+++ τ  
<zB2B> 
 


















∂ ττ  
=>zB2B=zB2B(zB1B) 
Let us now study the monopolist in period 1. From the above we have that )( 111 zττ =  and 
)( 2122 zz +=ττ , making the monopolist’s problem: 
Max [ ])()()))((()())(( 1221212122111111 zzzzzzzqfzzzqf MMMMM ⋅++++⋅+=Ψ τδτ  
<zB1B> 
 














































































































, applying (7) makes 





















Thus from (5) and (8) we see that the efficiency requirement of equal marginal productivity 
within time periods in the first equation of (4) does not hold. Furthermore, (7) and (8) do not 
satisfy the equal (discounted) marginal productivity of quota share over time in the second 
equation of (4). Hence we have neither efficiency between the groups, or over time. Hagem 
and Westskog (op.cit.) give some intuition about how this system nonetheless reduces market 
power’s adverse effects due to the fact that in the durable good situation it is profitable for the 
monopolist to lower price in subsequent time periods in order to sell additional quota. The 
buyers’ rational expectation of this may hurt the monopolist since the buyer will be willing to 




Let us now look at the short term model: 
 
II) Leasing of quotas 
The harvested shares for the competitive fringe and the monopolist in the two time periods are 
now described by: 
(1) in the  durable model is unchanged, while (2) is now;  
(2*) 222 zqq FF +=  and  222 zqq MM −=  
 
We see from (1) and (2*) that (3) still holds. The study of the fringe is changed as follows. 











hence )( 111 zττ = . 
 













Thereby making (again abusing notation) 
)( 222 zττ =  
Thus the monopolist’s problem in each period becomes: 
Max { }jjjjMjMj zzzqf ⋅+ )())(( τ  
<zBjB> 
 
















τ )(   
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Thus when comparing (5*) and (6*) with (7*), we see that the efficiency requirements of 








. Furthermore, (7*) does not 
satisfy equal (discounted) marginal productivity of quota share for the two groups, except 















PT.  Hence under 
special conditions we have efficiency between the groups, and/or over time.   
 
Finally, let us include history dependence in the quota allocation scheme. 
 
III) History dependence  
In the following we study quota allocation depending upon previous quota use. The intuition 
behind the history dependent model is as follows: Each firm is allocated a certain amount of 
quota in each time period. This quota can be sold or used in order to harvest fish. In time 
period 1 the fringe and the monopolist get an allocation from the fisheries managers. The 
monopolist sells some of its’ quota to the fringe. In period 2 the monopolists’ new allocation 
is reduced by some function of the sold quota, while the fringe’s allocation is increased in the 
same fashion.  
 













The quotas in the second period become: 
                                                          
TP
6





















If for instance 11 )( bzzg = , then note that b=0 gives us the leasing model, and b=1 gives the  
durable model, as long as allocations stay unchanged over time. Other values of b result in 
some form of history dependent model. In essence the durable model is a perfect history 
dependent model – you get to keep everything that you bought in the previous period, while 
the leasing model is perfectly history independent – you get to keep nothing of what you 
bought in the last period. 
 
The quota used in the history dependent model is determined by (1) in the first period and 
(2**) in the second period. Note that (3) still holds.  
 
The object is to  
Max FΨ = { }22221111 )()( zqfzqf FFFF τδτ −+−  
<qBF1B, qBF2B, g(zB1B)+zB2B> 
 
and 
Max MΨ = { }22221111 )()( zqfzqf MMMM τδτ +++ , 
<qBM1B, qBM2B, g(zB1B)+zB2B> 
 
































∂ ,  
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since only g(zB1B) is transferred to the second period (note that multiplying (5**) by zB1B and 
rearranging gives the total value of the quota zB1B). Hence ),( 2111 τττ z= . The use of history 













Thereby making (again abusing notation) 
))(( 2122 zzg +=ττ , making zB2B=zB2B(g(zB1B)). 
 
Using the same procedure as for the durable model at the beginning of this note, results in the 











































Comparing (5**) and (8**) reveals that contrary to the case of the durable model, efficiency 
within the first period may be satisfied for a given g function. The intuition behind this is that 
when the fringe is given historic rights depending on how much was bought from the 
monopolist, the monopoly power is reduced (or eradicated when the optimal amount is given 
to the fringe).  
 


















However, this is a simplification, since equation (6**) says τB2B is also a function of zB1B, making 
the solution of the actual differential equation non-trivial. Hence in order to find a g function 
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we assume that τB2B is independent of zB1B. We solve this non-homogeneous first order linear 













where K is a constant of integration (see Appendix for calculation). Hence given the 
assumptions made and a history dependence function g as described in (9), efficiency within 
the first time period is secured. 
 
Similarly, securing efficiency within the second period requires the equalisation of (6**) and 
(7**), which does not hold as we see that the fringe has higher marginal productivity of quota 






τ .  
 
When equating (8**) and the discounted value of (7**), that is securing efficiency between 






































δττ zzzg  
Hence we see that the g function for time efficiency is the same for both the monopolist and 
the fringe, since the derivative of (11) gives (10). We see from (11) that for τB1B> δτB2B, g>0 and 
vice versa. That is, if δτB2B >τB1B, the monopolist has an incentive to hold back the sales of quota 
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in order to sell more in the second period for a higher price. The optimal g remedies this by 
reducing the allocation to the monopolist in this situation. 
 
From equations (9) and (11) we see that it is possible to ensure at least market efficiency (in 
the first time period) or overall time efficiency in the history dependent model, hence this 
model has the potential to outperform the durable model, which can ensure neither efficiency 
type. The history dependent model can, by choosing a g as defined in (9) match the leasing 
model’s time efficiency as shown above under the described conditions. The history 
dependent model has the potential to more generally ensure time efficiency than the leasing 
model does. By equating equations (9) and (11) we find the condition under which both 
market (in the first time period) and time efficiency is secured in the history dependent model 
is given by K=-1. Hence, for this value of K, and the conditions assumed, the history 
dependent quota allocation model opens for market and time efficiency, and the trade-off 
between the two is avoided. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we study market and time inefficiency in a natural resource rights based 
institution, in order to shed light upon relevant and central issues regarding the optimal way of 
allocating rights. The time and irreversibility issue of rights allocation has long been 
discussed in the fisheries (Mathiasson, 1992), yet in most cases long term allocations seem to 
be the rule. Market inefficiency in the shape of market power has been increasingly debated in 
the aftermath of the introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) in fisheries. Quota 
concentration was also prior to ITQ implementation seriously considered by policymakers 
(Gauvin, Ward and Burgess, 1994; Hersoug, 2002). Despite measures taken to avoid 
concentration, quota is found to be on fewer and fewer hands (see overview in Armstrong and 
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Sumaila, 2001). In this paper three different dynamic mechanisms of allocating rights in the 
presence of market power are presented, the first being the durable quota model, where rights 
are allocated for both time periods studied. In this case we observe both market and time 
inefficiencies. This model approximates most of the ITQ systems in place today. The second 
model presented is a so-called leasing model, where rights are only allocated short term. In 
this scenario there is greater potential for ensuring time efficiency, as agents can appropriate 
the optimal amount of quota in each time period. Finally, a history dependent quota allocation 
model is presented, where quota allocations in the second period are made conditional upon 
quota bought or sold in the first period. An optimal history dependent allocation can eliminate 
either market power or time inefficiencies, and under specific conditions both. The system 
works in such a way, that if a quota monopolist has an incentive to cash in on a higher price in 
the second period, its allocation will be reduced in order to reduce the monopsony power. The 
allocational mechanism is simple to operate, as it only depends on the prices in the two 
periods and what is bought or sold in the first time period.  
 
A remaining question is; on the applied side, are there any actual history dependent 
allocations that are modelled in this fashion? When studying actual ITQ systems in operation 
today, we find several different mechanisms in play. A comprehensive ITQ management 
system was introduced for the first time worldwide in New Zealand in the 1980s. The initial 
allocation of fish was made in tons based on historic harvests. The allocation was highly 
transferable, only limited by some maximum clauses regarding concentration of quota. As the 
fisheries managers later found that aggregate harvest was too high for the existing stocks, a 
buy-back scheme was introduced. This scheme was not sufficient, and proportional cuts were 
also required before the regime became one of transferable harvest shares (Hersoug, 2002). 
Australia implemented a similar system for some fisheries (Hannesson, 1991). Iceland’s ITQ 
 16
system is a harvest share regime, in the sense that the ITQs are a fixed share in all perpetuity, 
as described by the durable model in this paper. Initial allocations were mainly dependent 
upon historic harvest (Arnason, 1993). We see that all the above ITQ systems most closely 
resemble the durable model presented here, and hence do not secure market or time efficiency 
in the presence of market power. In Namibia, where there is not a traditional ITQ system in 
place, we do however observe a management system in some ways similar to the history 
dependent model. Here quotas are allocated for a set price to different firms. The quota 
allocation time period is amongst other things dependent upon the firms’ degree of Namibian 
ownership or employment (Oelofsen, 1999). The firms cannot decline the allocated quota or 
ministerial price demanded (unless they decide to not fish the species in question at all in 
Namibian waters), but can lease quota to other users. However, if quota is leased out over a 
long time period, this will influence the amount of quota the firms are offered the next time 
around (L. Clark, pers. comm.). Hence we observe that allocation is made conditional upon 
the firm’s selling behaviour. In this case market power issues may be eliminated, both by the 
fact that quotas are not allocated in perpetuity, but also by the fact that leasing of quota to 
other firms affects future allocations. The quota allocation mechanism in Estonia (Vetemaa 
et.al., 2002) also has similarities with the history dependence model presented here. In Estonia 
90% of the total allowable harvest is allocated according to historic catch. The remaining 10% 
is auctioned. The allocated quota can be transferred. Hence in the next allocation round the 
acquired or sold quota in the previous period will affect the allotted quota to the agents in the 
fishery. However, it remains to be studied whether these history dependent allocations 
mechanisms are able to reduce the potential market power inefficiencies in the quota market. 
This due to the fact that the results from this study show that not just any old history 
dependent mechanism will do the job, but a specific history dependent design for the fishery 
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In the following we calculate g for efficiency within the first time period. Equating (5**) and 





























































11 Kzzg += δτ
τ , where K equals the constant of integration. 
 
